

1	EVERETT MACHINGTON THEODAY MAY 40 2044	
1	EVERETT, WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011	
2	AFTERNOON SESSION	
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5	THE COURT: Good afternoon. I want to preliminarily	01:34
6	thank counsel for accommodating the court in terms of	
7	setting off the oral decision to this time. I also want	
8	to commend counsel in terms of the briefing and the	
9	argument that was presented to the court in terms of	
10	addressing the issues before the court.	02:08
11	Obviously I've had a chance to review all of the	
12	materials that have been presented to the court, and I	
13	have taken those into consideration and have reviewed the	
14	memorandums and reviewed the cases and the statutes and	
15	the court rules that have been cited by counsel.	02:08
16	There are no disputed facts in this case. The	
17	petitioner seeks from the respondent the names, the	
18	addresses, and the date and the reasons for preliminary	
19	disqualification of all persons responding to a jury	
20	summons in King County Superior Court from January 1, 2009	02:09
21	through December 31, 2009.	
22	Respondent has provided the names and addresses of	
23	those persons who have been so summonsed, but has declined	
24	to give the identification of those persons who were	
25	disqualified and has declined to give reasons for the	02:09

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preliminary disqualification.

In his petition before the court, the petitioner asserts that if this information which jurors have been declined is disclosed to him, he will be able to determine the number of persons who are registered to vote in King County who are in fact ineligible to so vote. He does not seek this information pursuant to the Public Disclosure Act. Rather he asserts both a common law and a constitutional right to this information.

10 Respondent maintains that both the applicable statute
11 and the court rules preclude the discovery of this
12 information and it is not required to be disclosed by
13 either the common law or by the constitutional provisions
14 that are applicable as asserted by the petitioner.

The respondent furthermore asserts that the information 02:11
that is being sought is unconnected to any judicial
proceeding or record and, therefore, is not within any
constitutional provisions requiring disclosure.

As I indicated, both parties seek summary judgment from
this court. And, as I've indicated, there are no disputed
facts and both agree that this can be decided as a matter
of law.

The procedure for the creation and the maintenance of a master jury list is as set forth in the respondent's memorandum, in particular at Page 2 of that memorandum,

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and I will not repeat it in this oral argument, but will by reference herein incorporate it as if it were fully set forth.

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Needless to say, from that master list there is a preliminary determination of statutory disqualifications, 02:12 which includes whether the person that has been summonsed Obviously that is one of the is not a U.S. citizen. grounds for disqualifications, and this preliminary disqualification is based upon the self-report of the individuals responding.

11 Both RCW 2.36.072(4) and Court Rule GR 18(d) limit the 12 use of the information so obtained from prospective 13 Both of them contain the language: "Information jurors. 14 so provided to the court for preliminary determination of 15 qualification for jury duty may only be used for the term 16 such person is summonsed and may not be used for any other 17 purpose."

18 The petitioner asserts that to the extent that either 19 the court rule or the statute preclude the discovery of 20 the requested material, that the court rule and the 21 statute are in conflict with Article I. Section 10 of the 22 Washington constitution. That article states: "Justice 23 in all cases shall be administered openly and without 24 unnecessary delay."

The requested data is not a court record or a court

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1 document as even commonly understood or is as defined in 2 GR 22. It is not information that pertains to any pending 3 litigation or to a particular case, or to a particular judicial matter. This stands in stark contrast to the 4 5 rationale that was set forth in the *Coleman* case and the 02:16 other cases that dealt with juror information gathered in 6 7 a particular pending litigation. Even if the matter were 8 such that the court could allow discovery of the 9 information, the court still has authority to exercise 10 Even the *Nast* case, N-A-S-T, recognizes that discretion. 02:17 11 the common law right to inspect, in that case actual court 12 files, was not absolute, but was left to judicial 13 discretion.

14 In this particular case, both the statute and the 15 applicable court rule clearly prohibit the disclosure of 16 the requested information. As I've said, the petitioner 17 does not seek this disclosure for any reason involving the 18 monitoring or the improvement of the judicial system or 19 the jury selection process, but rather he seeks it for the 20 stated reason that he hopes to determine if persons are 21 voting illegally in King County, and then he will use that 22 information to help persuade elected officials and the 23 like to change the voting methodologies.

24 As laudable as it may be, this present disclosure 25 request is contrary to the express statement found in the 02:19

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statute and the court rule. As I said earlier, both the court rule and the statutes say that it may be used only for a certain term and may not be used for any other purpose.

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In addition, GR 31(k) indicates that the master jury source information, other than the name and address, is presumed to be private. The state legislature in 2008 and 2009 declined to expand the restrictions on the uses of the preliminary jury qualification information, and did not pass legislation that would have required courts to 02:20 send this information on to the county auditors or to the secretary of state, et cetera.

13 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. This court 14 would determine that the statute in this case is not in 15 conflict with the Washington constitution. As I've 16 mentioned, the requested data is not related to any case 17 or judicial proceeding and, therefore, there is no 18 conflict with the constitutional provision that has been 19 relied upon by the petitioner.

20 Therefore, the court will deny the petition and will 02:21 21 grant summary judgment to the respondent.

That concludes my remarks. I do note that the 22 23 petitioner had proposed an order. It appears to be 24 appropriate given my remarks, and unless there is some 25 other particular issue that the petitioner has with the 02:22

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1	form of the order, I would sign the proposed order.	
2	MR. KUFFEL: This is Tom Kuffel representing the	
3	respondent, Your Honor. I did submit a proposed order	
4	that would grant my client's summary judgment motion.	
5	There was also an order proposed by Mr. Stephens that had	02:22
6	he prevailed would have granted his client's	
7	THE COURT: Obviously I'm granting the order in terms	
8	of the respondent.	
9	MR. KUFFEL: Correct.	
10	THE COURT: So I will	02:22
11	MR. KUFFEL: I like my order.	
12	THE COURT: I'll sign that order unless there is a	
13	particular objection to it.	
14	MR. STEPHENS: No. If I remember right, it lists	
15	everything correctly.	02:22
16	THE COURT: Do you have the original of that?	
17	MR. KUFFEL: I believe I do, Your Honor.	
18	THE COURT: Why doesn't counsel look it over, give it	
19	to my law clerk, and I'll sign the original.	
20	MR. KUFFEL: Okay.	02:23
21	THE COURT: Unless there is anything else, that will	
22	conclude this matter. Court will be in recess.	
23	(Proceedings concluded.)	
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